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Disciplining the body? 
Reflections on the cross disciplinary import of ‘embodied meaning’ into 
interaction designi 
 
Thomas Markussen, Kolding School of Design, Denmark. 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is above all critically to examine and clarify some of the 
negative implications that the idea of ‘embodied meaning’ has for the 
emergent field of interaction design research. 
Originally, the term ‘embodied meaning’ has been brought into HCI research 
from phenomenology and cognitive semantics in order to better understand 
how user’s experience of new technological systems relies to an increasing 
extent on full-body interaction. Embodied approaches to technology design 
could thus be found in Winograd & Flores (1986), Dourish (2001), Lund (2003), 
Klemmer, Hartman & Takayama (2006), Hornecker & Buur (2006), Hurtienne & 
Israel (2007) among others. 
However, fertile as this cross-disciplinary import may be, design research can 
generally be criticised for being ‘undisciplined’, because of its tendency 
merely to take over reductionist ideas of embodied meaning from those 
neighbouring disciplines without questioning the inherent limitations it thereby 
subscribe to. 
In this paper I focus on this reductionism and what it means for interaction 
design research. I start out by introducing the field of interaction design and 
two central research questions that it raises. This will serve as a prerequisite for 
understanding the overall intention of bringing the notion of ‘embodied 
meaning’ from cognitive semantics into design research. Narrowing my 
account down to the concepts of ‘image schemas’ and their ‘metaphorical 
extension’, I then explain in more detail what is reductionistic about the notion 
of embodied meaning. Having done so, I shed light on the consequences this 
reductionism might have for design research by examining a recently 
developed framework for intuitive user interaction along with two case 
examples. In so doing I sketch an alternative view of embodied meaning for 
interaction design research. 
Keywords 
Interaction Design, Embodied Meaning, Tangible User Interaction, Design 
Theory, Cognitive Semiotics 
Interaction design is commonly viewed as a dominating trend in Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) that focuses on designing user experiences with 
technology. With the advent of tangible and physical computing, there have, 
over the last decade or so, emerged new opportunities for interaction 
designers to create technological systems or products that engage nearly 
every aspect of human experience: emotional feelings, vision, movement, 
gestures, and all sorts of interrelations thereof. As has been pointed out, 
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interaction is simply no longer unfolding by means of viewing and clicking on 
graphical icons on a screen, but is embedded into an augmented reality in-
between image, object and the surrounding space (cf. Winograd, 1997; see 
fig. 1). 
In addition to this extended user interface (sometimes referred to as ‘tangible’, 
‘graspable’, ‘intuitive’, and so on), interaction design also represents the 
proliferation of information technology into new territories of our everyday life. 
As a consequence, the attention of interaction designers is shifting from mere 
usability, functionality, and efficiency to playful, explorative and emotional 
interaction. 
Following from this radical design evolution, current HCI research is struggling 
to increase understanding of the emergent new forms of user interaction. In 
particular, interaction design poses two challenges to HCI research, which 
must be addressed. First, there is an urgent need to acquire more knowledge 
of the new cross-modal experiences that characterize full-body interaction 
with technological user interfaces. Related to this is the second challenge, 
which concerns the question of how users are able mentally to interpret novel 
technology use for practical purposes, play and social interaction. Since 
interaction design often implies the use of technology in unfamiliar contexts, 
users cannot always rely on their previous experiences and background 
knowledge, but have to create meaning and understandings of their own or 
collaboratively. Clearly, experience and meaning construction are mutually 
intertwined in user interaction, so these two topics must be dealt with as co-
constitutive aspects of the same problem. 
By picking up recent theories of the ‘embodied meaning’ and ‘embodied 
interaction’ from phenomenology and cognitive semantics, current HCI 
research has in fact made considerable progress in understanding this 
problem. Basically, these theories share the underlying assumption that 
people’s subjective, felt experience of their bodies in action play a key role in 
shaping human cognition and language (cf. Gibbs, 2005). However, to 
understand the full heuristic potential of this cross-disciplinary import, it is 
necessary first to pinpoint the knowledge gap in traditional HCI that the notion 
of embodiment is generally believed to have filled in. 
From Cognitive Models to Embodied Meaning in HCI 
It is widely acknowledged that traditional HCI and product semantics simply 
offer a too limited understanding for interaction design (see e.g. McCarthy & 
Wright, 2004; Dunne, 2006). Generally, these frameworks tend to treat user 
interaction as a disembodied abstract recognition process, where cognitive 
models are matched more or less unambiguously against the visual form and 
surfaces of an object (Norman, 1988; Krippendorff, 1989). A cognitive model is 
usually conceived to be a product of people’s long-term memory, which has 
been stored through repeated actions and experiences in the past. Thus, for 
instance, when I see the sharp contours of an oblong item in my kitchen, I 
automatically fetch the cognitive model of a ‘knife’ without even being 
aware of it. I simply recognize the object by relating its visual form to my 
previous experiences with knifes. The KNIFE MODEL provides me as it were with 
tacit knowledge for the appropriate use of the object under the given 
circumstances (e.g. cutting vegetables and meat, peeling skin of tomatoes, 
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etc.). In this way cognitive models are to a large extend responsible for the 
smooth flow of everyday activities and at the same time for freeing cognitive 
resources for other purposes such as social interaction (e.g. conversing your 
partner while preparing a meal). 
However, this conceptual framework is not equipped with sufficient 
explanatory power for dealing with central aspects of interaction design (cf. 
Markussen, 2008). For instance, principles of tangible and graspable user 
interaction do not necessarily obey the same kind of rules as visual recognition 
processes. Also, by embedding computational resources in physical 
environments users are sometimes confronted with hybrid functionalities that 
they have never experienced before. In such cases, either there simply is no 
cognitive model available for immediate recognition, or existing cognitive 
models must be reorganized or invented anew to fit the novelty and 
innovative aspects of technology use. In fact, it is an acclaimed goal of many 
interaction designers to create “aesthetic experiences comprised of both a 
bodily sensation and an intellectual challenge” (Petersen et al., 2004). Or to 
put it in other words: interaction design is no longer just used for fulfilling well 
prescribed goal-oriented tasks, but often requires that user’s build new 
concepts and learn through their bodily interaction with technology. 
The related ideas of ‘embodied meaning’ and ‘embodied interaction’ have 
been brought into HCI research from phenomenology and cognitive 
semantics in order to account for this subtle interplay of bodily interaction and 
meaning construction (see e.g. Winograd & Flores, 1986; Dourish, 2001; Fels, 
2001; Klemmer, Hartman & Takayama, 2006; Hornecker, 2005; Hornecker & 
Buur, 2006; Hurtienne & Israel, 2007). Contrary to cognitive models, embodied 
meaning is not to be understood in terms of abstract mental representation, 
but as primitive spatial patterns giving order and coherence to our experience. 
As mentioned above, these patterns are held to be responsible for the internal 
organization of meaning “at more abstract levels of cognition” (Johnson, 1987, 
pp. xix-xx). In this transfer of lower-level structures from an experiential domain 
onto higher-level domains of abstract meaning, imaginative and metaphoric 
capabilities of the human mind are assumed to play a key role. This potentially 
widens the notion of meaning construction in design from recognition to 
include learning and the invention of novel interpretations. 
In the following I look more closely on how this notion of embodied meaning in 
one particular instance has been developed into a new theoretical 
framework for interaction design. 
Embodied Meaning and Metaphorical Extensions in Intuitive 
User Interaction 
Most recently, Hurtienne & Israel (2007) has made a plea for using cognitive 
semantic theories of embodied meaning in the description of basic levels of 
intuitive user interaction. More specifically, they ground their framework on 
Lakoff & Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 
Johnson, 1987). In order to give an overview of these levels the authors start 
out by presenting a model of the ‘continuum of knowledge’ that they believe 
cover intuitive interaction (see fig. 1): 
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Fig 1. The Knowledge Continuum for Intuitive User interaction. 
Adapted from Hurtienne & Israel (2007) 
The first and most basic level concerns the body’s innate knowledge acquired 
through reflexes, instinctive behaviour and other neurobiological skills. The next 
‘sensor-motor level’ consists of general knowledge structures arising in infancy 
from developmental learning and interaction with the physical world. 
“Children learn for example to differentiate faces; they learn about 
gravitation; they build up concepts for speed and animation” (Hurtienne & 
Israel, 2007, p. 128). Then there is the ‘culture level’ of knowledge, which is 
sensitive to the place and location where people live. For instance, it makes 
good sense to build interfaces upon the desktop metaphor in Western cultures, 
but this happens not to be the case worldwide. Finally, Hurtienne & Israel 
distinguish a ‘specialist level’ of knowledge that consist of expertise acquired 
through one’s education, profession or hobby. 
Having done so, Hurtienne & Israel further suggest that the cognitive semantic 
concepts of ‘image schema’ and ‘metaphorical projection’, laid out by 
Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 1999), Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987), may help us 
to better understand the interweaving of those levels in tangible user 
interaction with technology. To see what is at stake here, let me just 
summarize what is meant exactly by these two concepts. 
The Relation between Sensor-motor and Socio-cultural levels 
of Meaning in Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
In The Body in the Mind (1987) Johnson defines an ‘image schema’ as “a 
recurrent, dynamical pattern of our perceptual interaction and motor 
programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience.” For instance, 
there is the CONTAINER schema for in-out orientations in space, the PATH 
schema for directions in space, and over 2 dozens other schemas that in a 
similar vein structure how the world show up for us (cf. Gibbs & Colson, 2006). 
What is particularly interesting is that Johnson (1987, pp. 30-31) in fact employs 
everyday design-related activities to account for how image schematic 
structures come into existence:  
Consider, for example, only a few of the many in-out orientations that 
might occur in the first few minutes of an ordinary day. You wake out of 
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a deep sleep and peer out from beneath the covers into your room. You 
gradually emerge out of your stupor, pull yourself out from under the 
covers, climb into your robe, stretch out your limbs, and walk in a daze 
out of the bedroom and into the bathroom […] You reach into the 
medicine cabinet, take out the toothpaste, squeeze out some 
toothpaste. (my obliteration) 
The idea here is that through such simple manipulations of objects and bodily 
actions, invariant spatial structures become gradually extracted and 
entrenched in our long-term memory system in the form of image schemas. In 
all of the above-mentioned experiences there are thus an underlying image 
schematic structure of containment, which can be represented 
diagrammatically as in fig. 2: 
 
     LM TR 
  
  
 
Fig. 2 CONTAINER schema 
The encircled ‘landmark’ (LM) is illustrating how in all of the above examples 
boundedness is perceived in relation to a container serving as a more or less 
stable reference point. In the waking out of a deep sleep, it is the sleep; in 
peering out from beneath the covers, it is the covers; in walking out the 
bedroom, it is the room, and so forth. On the other hand, that which moves is 
organised experientially as a trajector (TR) moving along a path, either out of 
(the arrow pointing to the right) or into the container (the opposite arrow). This 
indicates that most often the image schema involves some kind of force 
dynamics as well. In the waking up sequence, our consciousness is 
experienced as moving (as TR) out from a dazing to a waking state; in peering 
out from the covers and in climbing into the robe, it is respectively our gaze 
and whole body that operate as trajectors. Apart from such IN-OUT 
orientations, there are schemas for UP-DOWN, LEFT-RIGHT, NEAR-FAR, and 
numerous other experiential relations in space (Johnson, 1987, p. 126). 
It is important to note that the image schemas are not found as such in 
objective physical reality, but act rather as spatial structures that we are able 
to project onto inanimate or non-physical entities. Just think about the 
aforementioned action of stepping out of bed and climbing into your robe. 
Beds and robes do not possess an inside and an outside by themselves. This 
organization is utterly dependent on a subjective embodied experience of 
moving from one location to another location in space or feeling oneself 
being surrounding by a soft piece of textile. Moreover, these spatial structures 
must somehow be projected onto the objects at hand. 
Metaphorical Projection 
It is this figurative extension of structures from the sensor-motor level onto 
higher semantic levels in thought and language that is being referred to as 
‘metaphorical projection’. By studying an impressive range of verbal 
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expressions and sentences, Lakoff & Johnson (1980) found out that image 
schemas in fact act as ‘morphological skeletons’ ensuring the unity of 
conceptual meaning. Consider again the CONTAINER-schema, which is 
crucial for our ability to comprehend events, states, or our being among other 
people meaningfully.  Thus, we retrieve this schema for conceptualizing 
economic transactions (“The salesperson closed the deal”), emotions (“I’m in 
love!”), time (“you need to be here in five seconds!”), social relations (“He’s 
an outsider”), and so on. 
In Lakoff (1987, p. 283) the whole idea of how image schemas are 
metaphorically elaborated into conceptual meaning structures is summarized 
by what he refers to as the Spatialization of Form Hypothesis: 
Strictly speaking, the Spatialization of Form hypothesis requires a 
metaphorical mapping from physical space into a ‘conceptual space’. 
Under this mapping, spatial structure is mapped into conceptual 
structure. More specifically, images schemas (which structure space) are 
mapped into the corresponding abstract configurations (which structure 
concepts). The Spatialization of Form hypothesis thus maintains that 
conceptual structure is understood in terms of image schemas plus a 
metaphorical mapping. 
From this quote, it appears that metaphorical projections of image schemas 
rely on a unidirectional source-target construal principle as depicted in fig. 3: 
 
Fig. 3 
 
However, as Kimmel (2005) among others has convincingly argued this way of 
thinking entails a certain reductionism that we need to be aware of. First, the 
Spatialization of Form Hypothesis presupposes that embodied image schemas 
are ascribed ontological and functional primacy, whereas the impact of 
cultural and contextual factors in shaping conceptual structure is reduced to 
a minimum. 
Secondly, despite the fact that Johnson originally conceived image schemas 
as being relatively malleable, so that they can be modified to fit many similar, 
yet different, situations (Johnson 1987, p. 30), in many of his successors, there is 
clearly a tendency to treat image schemas as pure idealizations, i.e. invariant 
Undisciplined! Proceedings of the Design Research Society Conference 2008.  
Sheffield, UK. July 2008 
 
084/7 
structures of long-term memory being uninfluenced by the local contextual 
conditions. Yet I believe with Kimmel (2005) that there is a need for a concept 
like ‘situated image schemas’ accounting for how image schemas are co-
determined by their concrete embodied instantiation. 
Thirdly, image schemas are most often conceived as simple and isolated 
patterns in experience. However image schemas usually do not occur in 
isolated fashion, but rather are experienced grouped as gestalts or wholes 
involving the co-activation of several and even competing image schematic 
structures. This observation was made more than ten years ago by Cienki 
(1997), yet investigations of it seem only to be sparse. One of the things that 
Cienki drew attention to was that the gestalt groupings of image schemas 
cannot be understood merely as” a process of composition, given the nature 
of a gestalt structure that it has properties not simply derivable from its parts” 
(Cienki, 1997: 9). As we will see shortly, this phenomenon poses a challenge to 
the source-target construal principle. 
Mapping Image Schemas between the Physical and Digital 
World 
Interaction designers can no doubt benefit largely by turning towards 
conceptual metaphor theory and cognitive semantics. After all, metaphors 
have long been used in the design of digital media as a means for letting 
users understand new forms of human-computer interaction in terms of what 
they already know. 
The recent interest of Hurtienne & Israel (2007), but also Lund (2003) in using 
image schemas in the design of computer user interfaces should be seen 
along this very same line. The overarching aim in designing with image 
schemas is to enable users intuitively to comprehend abstract digital data in 
terms of knowledge rooted in their direct perceptual and bodily interaction 
with the physical world. However, if designers are not fully aware of the 
inherent reductionism underlying the standard image schematic framework, 
then it might cause some limited understandings of embodied meaning and 
meaning construction at large. Consider, Hurtienne & Israel’s own fictitious 
example – The Tangible Memories Box: 
 
Fig. 4. The Tangible Memories Box (reproduced from Hurtienne & Israel, 2007) 
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The Tangible Memories Box consists of 6 trays each of which represent a time 
period of 2 months. Each tray contains a memory item: an elephant for a visit 
to a zoo in January, a shell for a holiday trip in March, a dice from a gaming 
evening in May, and so forth. When connecting the box to a computer, folder 
icons for each item group appear on a screen. Then by placing a special 
cylinder in one of the smaller trays above, the display shows icons of each 
digital file, which belong to the item in the tray (Hurtienne & Israel, 2007, pp. 
132-33). 
In their design of this box, Hurtienne & Israel describe how they made use of 
essentially two organizing schemas – the CONTAINER and COLLECTION 
schema respectively. At the largest scale, the box itself is a CONTAINER 
mapped onto another (illusionary) CONTAINER, the screen. Inside the box, the 
6 trays act as smaller CONTAINERS for a COLLECTION of objects, which 
correspond to a COLLECTION of digital images stored in CONTAINERS on the 
screen, viz. the file folders. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 
I agree with Hurtienne & Israel that intuitive ease of use and comprehension is 
likely to follow from this part of their artefact. Especially, it is worth noting how 
the interface design cues users to extend their physical experience of 
containment metaphorically into a coherent conceptualization of otherwise 
scattered temporal events. More specifically, the computer interface plays on 
the conceptual metaphor TIME IS A CONTAINER, which allows for making 
different inferences such as MEMORIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS IN A 
CONTAINER. Recalling Bergson’s philosophical laments, one could say that this 
spatialization process rectifies time, thereby making a fugitive and abstract 
phenomenon intuitively graspable. 
The Reductionism of Embodied Meaning in Interaction Design 
However, there are a few uncertainties in Hurtienne & Israel’s argument 
having to do notably with the intermediate object, i.e. the cylinder. Or more 
precisely with their idea of how the image schematic structures involved in 
manipulating the cylinder is mapped ‘physically’ onto the manipulation of 
digital screen data. 
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There is two different image schemas involved in the cylinder interaction: (1) 
rotating the cylinder is organized experientially according to the LEFT-RIGHT 
schema; (2) placing the cylinder in an upright position is organized according 
to the UP-DOWN schema. Now, Hurtienne & Israel propose a way of mapping 
these structures onto two corresponding manipulations of digital data. Thus, 
left-right rotation of the cylinder would correspond to left-right navigation of 
the cursor from one image file to the next on the screen (fig. 6.1), whereas UP-
DOWN positioning of the cylinder should entail IN-OUT zooming on the image 
(see fig. 6.2). Yet, this might not be as intuitive as it is presumed to be. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
     Source: Rotating    Target: Linear cursor 
navigation  
Schema: LEFT-RIGHT   Schema: PATH 
 
 
 
 
   Source: Upright Positioning   Target: ZOOMING 
 Schema: UP-DOWN    Schema: IN-OUT 
Fig. 6.1, above: Rotation of cylinder mapped onto sequential navigation of 
the screen cursor. Fig. 6.2, below: UP-DOWN positioning of cylinder mapped 
onto IN-OUT zooming on an image 
The Role of Cultural and Contextual Factors 
Rotating a cylinder is something we typically associate strongly with IN-OUT 
zooming (the dashed diagonal arrow) not sequential navigation along a 
linear PATH. This associative link has become culturally entrenched as rotating 
cylindrical lenses on cameras, telescopes and binoculars have been used for 
this purpose for hundreds of years. And the current context, where users are 
presented with a cylinder for image manipulation seems only to revive this link 
in the users mind. So, unless users are able mentally to block this linkage to 
their long-term memory and straightforwardly to couple rotation with 
sequential navigation instead, this feature of the Tangible Memories Box is 
likely, I would claim, to be experienced as counter-intuitive. Simply because it 
runs counter to user’s contextually motivated expectations of use. 
One of the main reasons why Hurtienne & Israel ignores the potential impact 
from such cultural and contextual factors on the mapping of image schemas 
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is that they view innate and sensorimotor levels as functionally prior to these 
factors. Admittedly, they do operate with both a cultural and a specialist level 
of knowledge in their continuum model (see fig. 1 above). Yet, these levels 
are not regarded as playing any constitutive role when designing with image 
schemas. Thus, the authors write: “with our approach we would like to stick to 
the original intention of using TUI [tangible user interfaces] and stay at the 
sensorimotor level of our continuum of knowledge.” (Hurtienne & Israel, 2007, 
p. 130). But it is an error to believe that designing with embodied schemas is 
about ‘stripping off’ cultural layers in order to get down to the basics. Of 
course, it is possible from a purely analytical point of view, but the Tangible 
Memories Box itself more than indicates that it is reductionistic. 
Situated Image Schemas 
Another challenge for Hurtienne & Israel, as I see it, is to explain how user’s 
pre-existing cognitive model of zooming becomes co-structured in 
accordance with the UP-DOWN schema. To account for this, it is necessary to 
see “how compound image schemas emerge when simpler ones hook up in 
time or space to create more complex groupings” (Kimmel, 2005: 289). 
Appropriating the cylinder as an instrument for zooming thus requires that the 
user succeed in mentally fusing the UP-DOWN and IN-OUT schemas into a new 
integrated model of zooming. 
It is important to notice here that this meshing of schemas, or ‘blending’ as it is 
dubbed in Fauconnier & Turner (1998, 2002), makes new structural properties 
available that are simply not derivable from the act of manipulating a 
cylinder or digital data in itself. Neither is it possible to understand the zooming 
of image in terms of a unidirectional mapping of UP-DOWN onto the target 
domain, since the IN-OUT is in fact playing just as active an organizing role as 
do UP-DOWN. Instead, what this case reveals is that schemas from both the 
source domain and the target domain are grouped into a third hybridized 
structure serving inferential purposes for local understanding and meaningful 
interaction: Positioning of the cylinder up or down is inferred to be the cause 
of zooming effects on the screen. 
I believe with Kimmel (2005) that cases like this points to the ‘situatedness’ of 
image schemas. That is, how image schematic formation in user experience is 
highly sensitive to its local embedded instantiation. In its present state 
Hurtienne & Israel’s framework is unable to account for the situatedness of 
image schemas, since image schemas are viewed as invariant and de-
contextualized units. Moreover, as situated image schemas might rely on the 
contribution of structures from both source and target domains, it violates the 
source-target construal principle, which is the only mapping procedure 
recognized by Hurtienne & Israel. 
The Compound Nature of Embodied Schemas 
So far I have accounted for two reductionist notions of embodied meaning 
inherent in, but not in any way limited to Hurtienne & Israel (2007): (1) the ruling 
out of contextual and cultural factors in the mapping of image schemas onto 
conceptual structure; and (2) the view of image schemas as pure idealizations 
of long-term memory uninfluenced by the local contextual conditions. In this 
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final section, I argue that we also need to overcome the tendency to view 
image schemas as isolated and simple patterns in experience. 
In the existing research literature it is common to use the human body as a 
way of describing the bodily experience, whereby the CONTAINER schema 
comes into existence. Thus, Johnson (1987, p. 21) writes: 
Our encounter with containment and boundedness is one of the most 
pervasive features of our bodily experience. We are intimately aware of 
our bodies as three-dimensional containers into which we out certain 
things (food, water, air) and out of which other things emerge (food and 
water wastes, air, blood, etc). 
Johnson’s descriptions could perhaps give the impression that a primitive and 
simple structure of CONTAINEMENT like that depicted in fig. 3 is repeatedly 
activated in the experience of our body. However, Johnson is himself careful 
to recognize that slightly differing activations of even the same image schema 
might occur simultaneously in bodily experience. Let me try to illustrate this 
with the following example. 
RoBlood is a series of blood-taking robots that is meant to replace bio-analysts 
in the Danish health care sector. Now we all know that blood-taking is a very 
personal and intimate affair. So, in order to design a robot that patients would 
feel secure and safe about, the design team decided to push the soft and 
emotional aspects to the fore (Wetton, 2007). This design strategy is clearly 
reflected in the way in which technology use, emotions and form are unified 
in one of the design proposals named Sessio. Sessio integrates advanced 
blood-taking robotic technology into the armrest of an organically shaped 
interactive chair. When the patient places her arm on the armrest, it 
automatically adjusts in height and follows the patient’s movements. Then a 
comfortable vacuum surrounds the arm, so that it is enclosed and kept 
tranquil. The blood-taking process starts, when after the position and depth of 
veins have been identified, a needle from the armrest is inserted into the 
patient’s arm (Nørhave, Madsen & Springborg, 2007). 
 
 
Fig. 7 Sessio – a blood-taking robot 
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The Sessio experience interestingly reveals how stimulation of a fairly restricted 
area of the body’s surface may give rise to two seemingly competing 
activations of one and the same image schema. Sessio’s surrounding of one’s 
arm is experientially organized according to a schema of ENCLOSING as 
depicted in fig. 8.1. The open square illustrates how Sessio’s armrest acts as a 
CONTAINER closing in on a part of the body (the circle). On the other hand, 
the insertion of a needle is evoking the sense of an ENTRY into a CONTAINER 
(fig. 8.2). Here, the needle is experienced to follow a penetrating PATH that 
creates an opening of its own into the body. In this instance the body is itself 
profiled as being the CONTAINER (the square) of a contained object (a 
portion of blood; the small circle). Since all this is happening as an integrated 
part of the same haptic experience, it is reasonable to conclude from this that 
image schemas should not per definition by seen as simple and primitive 
patterns in experience. On the contrary, it might be better to see the body as 
a reservoir for complex and even ambiguous image schematic activations (fig. 
8.3). 
 
 
 
    8.1 ENCLOSING            8.2 ENTRY 
 
 
  
 
           Fig. 8.3. 
     Compound Image schema 
Note again, how the source-target principle is violated as both image 
schemas contribute with structures to a third higher-level experiential gestalt. 
To account for this gestalt, it may be useful to look at the emotional responses 
involved. Having a foreign and pointed object inserted into our body is 
typically not experienced is being particularly pleasant. On the other hand, 
people tend to approve of experiences where larger parts of their body are 
being surrounded in a smooth and comfortable way as in a hug, being 
covered by a blanket, etc. As the two image schemas are co-activated in the 
Sessio experience, an emotional tension is likely to emerge. The unpleasant 
feeling from the sting of a needle is as it were downplayed or even counter-
balanced by the pleasantness of comfortable vacuum embracing the 
patient’s arm; something that might motivate the formation of a new 
conceptual meaning – ‘an emotional robot’. 
Conclusion 
The findings of this paper point towards the need to revise some reductionist 
notions of embodied meaning currently influencing interaction design 
research. The reductionism found to be present in Huritenne & Israel (2007) 
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could, for instance, be traced in Lund (2003) and Hornecker & Buur (2006) as 
well. 
Needless to say, as I have focused primarily on theoretical issues and 
concepts, this conclusion must be further investigated through empirical 
studies. Thus, it would be of much interest to develop methods for retrieving 
information on the effect that the deliberate designing with image schemas 
might actually have on user experience. Do users really experience the 
artefact as the designer think they would? 
These missing empirical data notwithstanding, I suggest that the image 
schematic approach do have some positive implications for design. In my 
opinion the concept of image schemas is of valuable use to designers as a 
powerful descriptive tool in analysing central aspects of embodied meaning 
in technology design. Not only in users embodied interaction with, but also in 
the creative production of digital artefacts. However, on the basis of my case 
analysis, I find it relevant to single out 3 future developments that should be 
devoted to the concept of image schemas. 
(1) What the Sessio example was only able to indicate is that the 
understanding of compound image schemas in lived experience could 
benefit from richer phenomenological and qualitative descriptions of bodily 
experience. 
(2) There is a need to develop a dynamic description of how compound 
image schemas are build up in the scenario-like sequence of user experience. 
Thus, we have seen that image schemas are not necessarily instantiated as 
static transcontextual structures as Hurtienne & Israel among many others 
seem to maintain. Rather, image schemas can be transformed and tied up 
with each other according to dynamic principles related to how users 
experience the design context. The good question is of course what kind of 
principles? In Imaz & Benyon (2007) and Markussen (2008), it is demonstrated 
that the principle of ‘conceptual blending’ laid bare by Fauconnier & Turner 
(1998, 2002) might be the most promising way of accounting for these 
principles. But since this has only just begun to be studied in respect to 
interaction design further evidence is required. 
(3) More knowledge must be acquired as to how culturally motivated models 
of use interweave with the mapping of image schemas. The example of the 
Tangible Memories Box indicates that such cultural factors might play a 
constitutive role, and that we therefore have to revise the source-target 
construal principle. This issue is the object of a study by Quine (1991), who 
posits that higher-level cultural models indeed govern the mapping and 
grouping of image schemas. But Quine’s claim is still much discussed and 
there is therefore a need to clarify this question further. 
Obviously, design research must lean towards neighbouring disciplines such as 
cognitive semantics and phenomenology in its attempt to solve these 
problems. However, what I hope to have demonstrated is that if ideas from 
these disciplines are uncritically imported into the design field, then there is a 
risk of disciplining the body in unproductive ways as it might isolate the body 
from its contextual situatedness. Disciplining design research, on the other 
hand, could lead instead to a fruitful understanding of how the body and 
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contextual factors always act as two sides of a flipping coin. 
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